

31 October 1968

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: MAC ISINGLASS Briefing

25X1 1. On 30 October 1968 [redacted] of the [redacted] briefed OSA and the DD/S&T on the Model 192 ISINGLASS boost glide reconnaissance vehicle. The briefing included a review of the in-depth parametric analysis from which ISINGLASS evolved, the engineering technology used for the fabrication of an ISINGLASS and a vulnerability analysis against the Galosh ABM, the TALLIN A air defense system and a postulated System III system using an advanced type ABM called Missile X.

2. The general conclusion was that the ISINGLASS could survive in (1) any of the HE warhead environments, (2) the TALLIN A nuclear environment with a nuclear warhead, (3) the Galosh nuclear environment by circumventing the system deployed around Moscow and (4) the System III nuclear environment by accepting a very small denied area and programmed maneuvers.

25X1 3. Mr. Duckett, DD/S&T, stated his position that consideration of a nuclear environment was somewhat academic since he did not feel that a nuclear warhead would be used by any system against a single aircraft. He emphasized, however, that his position in no way negated the MAC effort since there were organizations within the intelligence community which would disagree with him. Mr. Duckett further stated that the major firm intelligence gap related to the MAC vulnerability study was confirmation of the estimated TALLIN A capability. Although he felt that the CIA estimate of [redacted] for the TALLIN A performance limit was reasonably accurate, one certainly couldn't deny the possibility of a [redacted] capability as well as jet heads on the warhead for terminal guidance.

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[redacted]
ASD/R&D/OSA

Page 2

Distribution:

Orig - ASD/R&D/OSA

1 - D/R&D/OSA

1 - A(T)D/R&D/OSA

1 - PSD/R&D/OSA

1 - ASD/R&D/OSA(Chrono)

2 - (ISINGLASS file, and Advanced Concepts)